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  At Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, WTO members agreed to launch new 
trade negotiations on a range of subjects and other work, including issues concerning 
the implementation of the present agreements.  Various issues in the WTO Doha 
Development Agenda were dealt with in the form of ‘single undertaking’ which 
include the trade remedy rules, i.e., anti-dumping and subsidies rules.  The EU, 
being the largest regional economy in the world, was no doubt a heavyweight in the 
Doha multilateral trade negotiations and so was its trade policy of great weight.  To 
date, the EU had put forward a total of 10 submissions to clarify and improve the AD 
Agreement and the SCM Agreement at the end of 2006, and the submissions revealed 
the EU’s attitude toward the Rules negoation; not aggressive but prudent and cautious. 
While Doha Round seemed doomed and gloomy, the EU, on the other hand, launched 
its new trade policy, the ‘Global Europe’ framework in 2006 pursuant to the goals set 
up by the conclusions of Lisbon European Council.     
   
The new EU’s trade policy is comprised of a wider array of trade issues, aiming 
at maintaining its global competitiveness, and in light of the growing fragmentation 
and complexity of the process of production and supply chains as well as the growth 
of major new economic actors, particularly in Asia, there was a need for a revision of 
the EU Trade Defence Instruments (TDI) .  A “Green Paper” on TDI was thus 
drafted and presented for public consultation by the Commission at the end of 2006, 
which is intended to make sure EU TDI fit in the trend of globalization as well as the   
European multinational corporations' competiveness in the new economic context.       
   
This paper intends to explore if the possible trade policy adjustment in the EU 
TDI will also facilitate to resolve the discrepancy between the EU and its counterparts 
in the Rules negotiations and provide a solid basis for the conclusion thereof.  
Section II of the article presents the ongoing DDA negotiations, inter alia, Rules 
negotiations.  Section III will probe the negotiation objective and issues that EU 
concern by examining its submissions to the Negotiating Group on Rules as well as its 
implementation assessment.  The EU’s new trade policy, in particular, that on the 
newly released “Green Paper” on the TDI will also be analyzed in section IV.  This 
paper concludes that the EU policy on TDI is expected to be  adjusted toward a 
framework favorable to other economic operators, such as users and consumers. 
Whether the public consultation for “Green Paper” is a process of consensus building 
is still an argument.    It is likely that EU delegate will narrow down the gap between 
the EU and other exporting-oriented members in the Rules negotiations should the 
  Irevised TDI be expanded to a large extent. 
  III. Introduction 
  
In 2001, WTO members agreed to launch new round of trade negotiations in the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar.    The entire package for the new round 
of trade negotiations is called the Doha Development Agenda.
1 Various issues in the 
WTO Doha Development Agenda were dealt with in the form of ‘single undertaking’ 
which include the trade remedy rules, i.e., anti-dumping and subsidies rules..
2   
European Union (EU)
3, one of the major initiators and victims of the trade remedy 
instruments among WTO members, considered that clarification and improvement of 
the current multilaterial trade remedy disciplines were drastically required in the  
Doha Round.  Yet, the EU that has 25 member states makes up 40% of the world's 
merchandise trade
4 has become the largest regional economic community, and 
because of its important position, its trade policy in Doha multilateral trade 
negotiations was without doubt of heavy weight. 
  
It was EU’s intention to improve the current multilateral disciplines on 
anti-dumping and subsidies at the initial stage of the Doha negotiations since 2001.  
However, no evidence on paper in the WTO has shown that EU is willing to take a 
more positive attitude to deviate from preserving the effectiveness of the 
anti-dumping as well as the subsidies and countervailing instruments.  As EU 
inclines to be more prudent, it has not yet grant its approval on submissions tabled by 
its allies of numerous export-oriented economies, particularly, the “Friends of 
Anti-dumping Negotiations” (FAN).  While Doha Round seemed doomed and 
gloomy, the EU, on the other hand, initiated its new trade policy, the ‘Global Europe’ 
framework in 2006 , which was designed to enhance the EU’s capacity to compete in 
                                                 
1  WTO, The Doha Development Agenda, [hereinafter the DDA],available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/doha1_e.htm#28. Last visited on Mar. 7, 2007, 
Trade issues in the DDA include agriculture, services, market access for non-agricultural products 
(NAMA), trade related aspects of intellectual property rights(TRIPS), relation between trade and 
investment, interaction between trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement, 
trade facilitation, WTO rules, dispute settlement understanding, trade and environment, electronic 
commerce, small economies, trade, debt and finance, trade and transfer of technology, technical 
cooperation and capacity building, least-developed countries, special and differential treatment, 
organization and management of the work programme.   
2 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted November 20, 2001, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. Last visited on Mar. 7, 2007 at 
para. 47.  Since disciplines for safeguard measures are not a subject of the DDA, it will be excluded 
from discussion in this paper.  Disciplines for fishery subsidies and regional trade agreement 
mandated by DDA will be also excluded from discussion in this paper. 
3 Although the three European Communities (EC, ECSC and EAEC) technically still exist, and the 
European Union as such does not have legal personality, throughout this paper the term European 
Union or EU shall be used to denote the Communities. 
4  The WTO data shows that the export value of the EU amounted to $3,988 billion U.S. dollars in 
merchandise trade of the world, and its import valued $4,120 billion U.S. dollars in 2005. WTO, 
WORLD TRADE REPORT, 2006, at 11. 
  1the global economy.
5  A “Green Paper”  was also presented for public consultation 
by the Commission.
6  The “Green Paper”, a reflection on the EU’s Trade Defence 
Instruments (TDI), was an integral part of Lisbon agenda.  It does not challenge the 
fundamental value of TDI, rather it carries the objective to transform current TDI into 
a modern mechanism to facilitate trade, but at the same time remain an effective 
response to unfair trading practices.   
 
The resumption of DDA negotiations in 2007 is expected to keep WTO members 
on track toward the final stage of the Doha Round while the EU “Green Paper” on  
TDI will be put for public consultation.    Whether the result of public consultation on 
“Green Paper” will have impact on EU’s current policy in DDA Rules negotiations 
deserves further studying, this paper intends to explore if the possible trade policy 
adjustment in EU TDI would resolve the discrepancy between the EU and its 
counterparts in Rules negotiations so as to provide a solid basis for the conclusion 
thereof.  For this purpose, section II of the article will present the ongoing DDA 
negotiations,  inter alia, Rules negotiations, and section III will probe negotiation 
objective and issues that EU concern through examining its submissions to the 
Negotiating Group on Rules.    The EU’s new trade policy, in particular, on the newly 
released “Green Paper” on TDI will also be analyzed in section IV. 
 
II. The Development of DDA Rules Negotiations 
 
A. Rules Mandate 
  
In 2001, WTO members agreed in Doha, Qatar to launch new trade negotiations 
on a range of subjects and other work, including issues concerning the 
implementation of the present agreements.  WTO members made it clear in written 
documents in a ministerial declaration, the Doha Ministerial Declaration, to provide  
mandate for negotiations.  One of the important DDA issues is the negotiations in  
“WTO Rules”, and the rules negotiations mainly focus on subject matters related to 
the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994
7 and the Agreement 
                                                 
5 Mandelson to 'Lisbonise' EU Trade Policy, EURACTIV, Oct. 5, 2006, available at 
  http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/mandelson-lisbonise-eu-trade-policy/article-158509. Last visited 
on Mar. 25, 2007   
6 Commission of the European Communities, Europe’s trade defence instruments in a changing global 
economy – A Green Paper for public consultation, COM(2006) 763 final. Brussels, Dec. 6, 
2006.[hereinafter Green Paper] 
7 The Agreements on Implementation of the Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
[hereinafter the AD Agreement]. 
  2on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
8 Renegotiation of the WTO anti-dumping 
and subsidies rules was a concession by both developed and developing countries as a 
condition to move forward in the Doha Round.
9    The anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
negotiations were, thus managed to put relative strict limits on the scope and 
proceedings in the mandate of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.    Paragraph 28 of the 
Doha Declaration, tilted WTO Rules, states: 
 
“In the light of experience and of increasing application of these 
instrument by Members, we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and 
improving disciplines under the Agreement on implementation of Article 
VI of the GATT 1994 and on Subsidies and Countervailing measures, 
while preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these 
Agreements and their instruments and objectives, and taking into account 
the needs of developing and least-developed participants.  In the initial 
phase of the negotiations, participants will indicate the provisions, 
including disciplines on trade distorting practices, that they seek to clarify 
and improve in the subsequent phase.” 
 
The mandate was quite precise.  It aimed to clarify and improve anti-dumping 
and subsidy rules without having any fundamental change on the Anti-dumping and 
Subsidies Agreements.  For instance, in anti-dumping regime, the language of 
“preserving the basic concepts, principles, and effectiveness” in the Mandate denoted 
that concepts and principles of the AD Agreement such as dumping, price 
discrimination, or injury which must be maintained and cannot be altered.  Also, 
negotiations shall serve as an effort to preserve the effectiveness of the AD Agreement 
and the SCM Agreement.    Any improvements to the functioning of the anti-dumping 
and anti-subsidy mechanisms that will reduce their effectiveness cannot be accepted 
either.  However, the effectiveness of current WTO anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
rules per se also connotes, to some extent, bias discretion and cumbersome procedures 
that could still persist in members’ anti-dumping and subsidies codes.  For that 
reason, it is expected that reforms in the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement will 
not be drastic in the Rules negotiations.
10    
 
Additionally, the mandate required WTO members to negotiate WTO 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy rules in two stages.  In the initial stage, WTO 
                                                 
8 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, [hereinafter the SCM Agreement]. 
9 William A. Kerr and Laura J. Loppacher, Anti-dumping in the Doha Negotiation: Fair Tales at the 
World Trade Organization, J. WORLD TRADE, 38(2) 211, 2004. 
10 Id., at 215. 
  3members needed to refer to the provisions, including disciplines on trade distorting 
practices they intended to clarify and improve.  Review on the progress was 
scheduled at the Fifth Session of Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, 
September 2003.
11  After identifying issues that were in need of clarification and 
improvement, WTO members then proceeded with the second stage on substantive 
clarification and improvement of rules identified in the AD Agreement and SCM 
Agreement.  The process of the anti-dumping and subsidy negotiations will be held 
and supervised by the Negotiating Group on Rules.
12  
 
B. Right on Track on Rules Negotiations 
  Rules negotiations have been well proceeded by the WTO members since the 
Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001.  Given the increasing disputes between 
members in their implementation of the AD Agreement, negotiations on clarifying 
and improving multilateral anti-dumping rules have been the spotlights in the Rules 
trade talks. At the initial phase of identifying the issues for clarification and 
improvement in accordance with the Rules mandate, WTO members were aggressive 
in submitting their formal papers which identified their concerned issues of a general 
nature to the Rules Negotiating Group.  The progress was made that participants of 
WTO Rule negotiation had completed stock-taking in the Cancún Ministerial 
Conference where 141 position papers were presented to identify issues they 
concerned.
13
  Although the work of Rules negotiations was once delayed due to the general 
situation in the DDA negotiations following the Cancún Ministerial Conference, it has 
since the spring of 2004 resumed its work in a vigorous and intensive manner.
14 The 
fact was that the “July Package” provided an important step to push forward the DDA 
negotiations in some areas which includes Rules  negotiations.  In  the  “July  Package”, 
the General Council of WTO takes note of the report by the Chairman of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee (TNC) on various proposals with respect to the issues of 
WTO Rules.
15, and the “July Package” thus reassures the continuing of  Rules 
negotiations. 
                                                 
11 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2 at para. 52. 
12 The task of the Negotiating Group on Rules is to host negotiations in the areas of anti-dumping, 
subsidies, and regional trade agreements. 
13 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Note by the Chairman, Compilation of Issues and Proposals 
Identified by Participants in the Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/143, Aug. 22, 2003. 
14 Negotiating Group on Rules, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiating Committee, TN/RL/8, 
Apr. 8, 2004. 
15 Id., para. (f). It provides; “Rules, Trade & Environment and TRIPS: the General Council takes note 
  4In the post-“July package” period, participants of Rules negotiations began to 
accelerate and intensify negotiating process.  Members started to work on the basis 
of proposing specific amendments to Agreement text to ensure Rules negotiations 
have significant evolvement, both in terms of substance and of progress.
16 The Rules 
negotiating process was fundamentally sound.  The Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference in December, 2005 provided an opportunity to bring the Doha Round 
closer to its conclusion in all areas.  Ministers in Hong Kong acknowledge the 
achievement of substantial results in all aspects on Rules mandate which is important 
to the DDA, and take note on the issues discussed with respect to anti-dumping,  
subsidies, and countervailing measures.
17  Ministers further directed the Rules 
Negotiating Group to complete the process of analyzing the proposals and launch a 
text-based negotiation of the AD and SCM Agreements  Consolidating texts of 
amendments of the Anti-dumping and SCM Agreements shall also be prepared in a 
timely fashion before the new deadline of the DDA, the end of 2006.
18   
 
After the Hong Kong meeting, Rules negotiation has been moved intensively and 
rigorously.  Participants have scrutinized large numbers of proposals, almost 
exclusively on the basis of specific proposed texts on anti-dumping.  Proposals for 
texts with respect to subsidies and countervailing measures are, somewhat tardy.
19  
The suspension of DDA negotiations in July 2006, which was once delayed for Rules 
negotiating process, was resumed by the participants in early 2007.
20 Currently Rules 
negotiating process is right on track and participants deeply engage and spend 
constructive efforts to ensure that Rules be in a solid basis for the final stage of the 
Doha Round.  It is undeniable that the Doha Rules negotiations have gained much 
attention from WTO members more than six years later after the DDA negotiation.  
It is anticipated that the result on Rules negotiations will ultimately be linked closely 
to other aspects of the DDA negotiations, such as agriculture and non-agricultural 
market accesses, as it is required in the "single undertaking" in DDA.
21  Without 
                                                                                                                                            
of the reports to the TNC by the Negotiating Group on Rules and by the Special Sessions of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment and the TRIPS Council. The Council reaffirms Members' 
commitment to progress in all of these areas of the negotiations in line with the Doha mandates.” 
16 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiating Committee, 
TN/RL/13, July 19, 2005, at 2.   
17 WTO, Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18, December 2005, WT/MIN/(05)/DEC, Dec. 22, 2005, 
Annex D, paras. 1, 6-8.   
18 Id., paras. 10-11. 
19 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiating Committee, 
TN/RL/19, July 22, 2006, at 1. 
20 Participants in Rules negotiation started to submit their proposals in January 2007, before the 
resumption DDA trade talks in February 7, 2007. Participants, such as Australia, have separately 
submitted their proposals before resumption of trade talks. See WTO, Withdraw of Subsidies, 
Communication from Australia, Revision, TN/RL/ GEN/115/Rev. 1, Jan. 24, 2007.. 
21 The Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, at para. 47. 
  5doubt, the results of the Rules mandate in all areas are the essential elements 
reflecting the overall balance in the Doha Round.  The negotiations in the past 
suggest that any results in WTO Rules, particularly in anti-dumping, must be highly 
detailed and text-based.  Also, political concern is crucial for the results of Rules 
negotiations, but such results are not likely to emerge before a comparable level of 
detail on the trade-offs in other areas of the DDA is clear.
22
 
III. EU in Rules Negotiations 
 
A.  Anti-dumping  Negotiation 
 
1 .   R e a s o n s   f o r   P a r t i c i p a t i o n                                                          
 
No one will refute that the AD Agreement, and in associated with the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System, have contributed considerably to clarifying and 
improving anti-dumping disciplines since the establishment of the WTO.  However, 
whether the current AD Agreement fits well to the modern changing business context   
remains in question.  There are several reasons for the EU's support on the Doha 
anti-dumping renegotiation: 
 
（1） The Surge of Anti-dumping Actions   
 
The effecting of the WTO trade liberalization was not synchronized among the 
members, but the fact is that many of the WTO members have chosen increased 
recourse to the anti-dumping instrument in order to be able to address unfair and 
injurious trade practices.  The WTO data reveal that members have totally initiated 
1237 anti-dumping actions from the establishment of WTO until the Doha Ministerial 
Conference was held in 2001, and increased to 2938 up to June 30, 2006.
23
 
（2）  The EU Has Become the Major Anti-dumping Target     
 
As the AD Agreement is part of the single package of the WTO, all members are 
automatically bound by the AD Agreement.
  24  Members who adopt and utilize 
                                                 
22 Chiang-feng Lin, The WTO Anti-dumping Negotiation Development – Taiwan’s Perspective, in THE 
WTO TRADE REMEDY SYSTEM, EAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVES, 227 (MITSUO MATSUSHITA, DUKGEUN AHN, 
AND TAIN-JY CHEN EDS, CAMERON MAY, LONDON, 2006) 
23 AD Initiations: By Exporting Countries, From: 01/01/95 To: 30/06/2006, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab1_e.xls. Last visited on 03/20/2007. 
24 AD Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1. 
  6anti-dumping legislation must be in accordance with the provisions of the AD 
Agreement, and many of them have started using the anti-dumping laws that they 
adopt .  The frequent anti-dumping users existed at the time of the Uruguay Round, 
are mostly the developed countries that have now also become major targets of 
anti-dumping actions.
25    In particular, the EU and his member states have faced with 
a total of 501 anti-dumping investigations from 1995 until 2006 and become one of 
the major targets of anti-dumping actions.
26   
 
（3）The AD Agreement Needs Further Clarification and Improvement     
  
The widespread and ever-expanding use of the anti-dumping instruments has 
triggerd considerable discrepancy between WTO members in their interpretation and 
application of the current anti-dumping rules.  Disputes pursuant to the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes in 
WTO have therefore increased.  WTO members have totally filed 242 complaints 
under the Dispute Settlement System for the period from 1995 to 2001, 38 of which 
relate to anti-dumping disputes.
27 The panels and Appellate Body have contributed to 
greater clarification in the interpretation of the AD Agreement but some areas thereof 
would benefit from further clarification and improvement. 
 
（4）Anti-dumping Actions Are Costly And Lack of Transparency 
  
Anti-dumping investigation is a time-consuming and costly proceeding. 
Cooperation in anti-dumping investigations inevitably leads considerable human and 
financial burden to participants therein, which results in unsatisfactory feeling among 
the WTO members.  Reduction in administrative burden associated with the 
participation in anti-dumping proceedings is thus drastically needed.  Improvements 
in transparency and rights of parties concerned during the anti-dumping proceedings 
shall also be merited.
28  
 
2. Objectives and Issues Concerned 
                                                 
25 E DWIN VERMULST, THE WTO ANTI-DUMPING  AGREEMENT  5-6  (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1st ed. 2005).  Until 1990, the major frequent anti-dumping users were Australia, Canada, the 
EU, and the United States.   
26 Cliff Stevenson, Global Trade Protection Report 2007 Data & Analysis, Apr. 2, 2007, available at 
http://www.antidumpingpublishing.com. Last visited on 04/14/2007. 
27 Panel/AB Reports and Arbitration Awards in WTO AD Agreement Disputes, World Trade Law net, 
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/ad.asp; List of All WTO Complaints Brought 
Pursuant to the DSU, World Trade Law Net, available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/database/searchcomplaints.asp. Last visited on 03/22/2007.   
28 Pierre Dider, The WTO Anti-Dumping Code and EC Practice Issues for Review in Trade 
Negotiations, 35 J. WORD TRADE (1), 33 (2001). 
  7 
Based on the abovementioned reasons, the EU intends to pursue four main goals 
through taking clarification and improvement of the current WTO anti-dumping rules.   
These objectives are to strengthen the current disciplines, preserve the effectiveness 
and objectives of the anti-dumping instrument, simplify and clarify certain provisions, 
and consider the need of developing countries.
  Issues needed to be clarified and 
improved to achieve such goals are specified as follow.
29   
  
（1）Strengthening the Disciplines 
  
To strengthen the current anti-dumping rules, issues with respect to disclosure 
and access to non-confidential documents, mandatory lesser duty rule, public interest 
test, swift dispute settlement mechanism for initiation of investigation, as well as 
reduction of investigation costs are in need of further clarification and improvement. 
  
（2） Preserving the Effectiveness And Objectives of the Anti-dumping 
Instrument 
  
Economic globalization has increased the opportunity of circumvention, and it  
has become increasingly difficult to secure the enforcement of anti-dumping measure.   
Bearing in mind that anti-dumping measures are the result of complex, intensive and 
costly investigations, it is necessary to preserve the effectiveness and objectives of the 
anti-dumping measures  However, the current AD Agreement is silent on this issue.  
Rules with respect to anti-circumvention are thus needed.
30
  
（3）Simplifying And Clarifying Certain Provisions 
  
The findings indicated in various WTO Panel and Appellate Body reports have 
contributed to significant clarification or simplification on some anti-dumping rules. 
Provisions being clarified or simplified therein should be therefore included in the AD 
Agreement as part of the context. 
  
（4）Considering the Needs of Developing Countries. 
 
                                                 
29 WTO, Submission from the European Communities Concerning the Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of GATT 1994 (Anti-dumping Agreement), TN/RL/W/13, July 8, 2002, at 2-4. 
30 The EU proposed provisions relating to anti-circumvention of anti-dumping measures during the 
Uruguay Round.  However, the conclusion of Uruguay Round did not resolve circumvention issues.   
Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GATT: From Havana Charter to the World Organization, 34 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L 145 (1995). 
  8Special and differential treatment in the context of implementation of the AD 
Agreement is critical important for developing countries.  The EU stands for the 
needs of developing countries and a special and clearly defined developing country 
package should be prepared for the conclusion of the Doha Round.  In this respect, 
parameters and requirements shall be established to serve the interests of developing 
countries for the purpose of reducing the possibility of abusing the anti-dumping 
instrument. 
 
B. Negotiations in Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
  
1. Reasons for Participation 
  
Negotiations in subsidies and countervailing measures do not obtain the same 
level of attention as that of anti-dumping in Rules negotiations, some issues in the 
SCM Agreement are still in need of further clarification and improvement. The 
obligations of WTO members, in respect of subsidies laid down in the SCM 
Agreement, are categorized in the “traffic lights” approach – red (prohibited), green 
(non-actionable), and amber (actionable).
31  Prohibited or red subsidies, i.e. export 
subsidies, have gained much attention in the WTO Dispute Settlement system since 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.  During the period of 1995 to 2001, only  
one of the eight dispute settlement cases brought against subsidy practices involved 
exclusively export subsidies.
32    
 
For the actionable subsidies, in particular those indirectly granted to certain 
products, are much less explicit as they are less functional and effective than those for 
export subsidies, similarly, non-actionable or green subsidies, i.e. R&D, environment 
and regional aids, have proven to be ineffective because they are only available by the 
end of 1999.
33  With respect to countervailing measures, experience has shown that 
investigations can still be initiated without the necessary justification despite of 
increased initiation standards.     
 
2. Objectives and Issues Concerned 
 
There are needs for clarification and improvement on the current “traffic lights” 
                                                 
31 Anwarul Hoda and Rajeev Ahuja, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Need for 
Clarification and Improvement, J. WORLD TRADE 39 (6) 1012 (2005). 
32 WTO, WTO Negotiations Concerning the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Proposals of the European Communities, TN/RL/W/30, Nov. 21, 2001, at 1. 
33 The SCM Agreement art. 31& art.6.1 (subsidies presumed to cause serious prejudice), art. 8 & 9 
(non-actionable subsidies for R&D, environment and regional aid) expired on 1 January 2000.   
  9approach pertaining to the subsidies categories as only few subsidies rules are 
considered functional.    It is necessary to streamline the current rules of subsidies and 
countervailing measures through establishment of clear and uniform rules for all types 
of subsidies.    Therefore, EU’s main objective in the negotiation of Doha subsidy and 
countervailing disciplines is to ensure workability and effectiveness of the current 
SCM Agreement.
34 The EU has taken steps to identify issues that should be clarified 
and improved in order to meet the objective.  In general, these issues can be 
categorized into subsidy disciplines, countervailing disciplines, and the need of 
developing countries.   
 
（1）Subsidy Disciplines 
 
A widespread of non-transparent subsidies are currently disguised and intended 
to circumvent the subsidy disciplines under the SCM Agreement.  These disguised 
subsidies have the same severe trade-distorting effects as that of direct subsidies.    To 
effectively bring such subsidies into the reign of multilateral subsidy disciplines, some 
issues need to be addressed and be further perfected.  These issues include more 
operational rules for the disguised subsidies and state-controlled entities, and these 
disguised subsidies can be characterized to make “entrust or direct” promulgated in 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.  Issues relating to strengthen current subsidy 
disciplines also include clearer rules for local content subsidies.  Also, clarifications 
on export financing and effective notification rules are covered.  The EU also 
proposed issues with regard to subsidies and environment which are worth the 
attention.
35  
 
（2） Countervailing  Disciplines 
  
  For the disciplines of countervailing measures, there is a need for improvement 
of the asymmetry between the SCM Agreement and the AD Agreement.    Issues with 
respects to strengthening of the rules, increase of the effectiveness, and reduction of 
the cost of investigations are explored in the proposal for the AD Agreement, and are 
expected to gain the same level of clarification and improvement in the multilateral 
disciplines of countervailing measures.
36
  
（3）Developing Countries 
  
                                                 
34 TN/RL/W/30, supra note 432, at 2. 
35 TN/RL/W/30, supra note 32, at 2-4. 
36 Id., at 4-5. 
  10It is unquestionable that tight disciplines on trade distorting subsidies are in fact 
in the interests of all participants in the world trading system, including developing 
countries, and certain types of subsidies will contribute to development of the 
countries, particularly, the developing countries.  The EU deems special and 
differential treatment necessary for some developing countries, and special and 
differential treatment shall be clearly defined and be provided on a temporary basis to     
countries limited.  For least developed countries, notification obligation of specific 
subsidies under Article 25 of the SCM Agreement could be conducted under the 
framework of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism.
37
 
C. Clear Objectives but Prudent Approach in Rules Negotiations       
  
Apparently, the EU has clear goals on specific issues at the beginning of Rules 
negotiations.  The EU has totally presented 10 submissions to clarify and improve 
the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement by 2007. The submissions show that the 
EU does not seem to be aggressive but prudent and cautious in the Rules  negotiations.   
In respect of anti-dumping regime, the EU handed over 5 submissions to identify and   
clarify issues concerned, and 2 submissions to propose specific rules needed to be 
improved.  However, the EU’s effort in Rules negotiations is unjustifiable from the 
number of submissions therein.  To some extent, some issues concerned by the EU, 
such as mandatory lesser duty rule, have been identified and proposed for 
improvement by other participants, particularly the FAN’s associates.
38 Yet, no 
evidence on paper shows the EU’s willingness to take a more affirmative and 
aggressive attitude to endorse the submissions of FAN and its associates, i.e., position 
of tightening disciplines on the conduct of anti-dumping investigations.  On my 
observation in the Rules negotiation forum, the EU tended to be cautious and prudent 
on the issues proposed or drafted to be improved by FAN and its associates.    The EU 
normally raises questions regarding the issues, or drafts amendments to other 
member’s submissions.  It is highly regarded that the proposed amendments will 
increase burden on EU’s investigation  authorities.    
 
Alternatively, the EU strategically concentrated on the issues related to its 
objective of strengthening the current disciplines in the second phase of the Rules 
negotiations,  i.e., after Cancún Ministerial Conference.  Two submissions for 
amendments of the AD Agreement have been put on the table.  One is to set up an 
                                                 
37 Id., at 5. 
38 See WTO, Proposals on The Mandatory Application of The Lesser Duty Rule, Paper from Brazil, 
Hong Kong; China, India, and Japan, TN/RL/GEN/99, Mar. 3, 2006.   
  11independent group of experts to resolve the dispute of initiation of investigations.
39  
The other is to reinforce the transparency and streamline the anti-dumping actions by 
setting up an anti-dumping activities review system conducted by the Committee on 
Anti-dumping Practices.
40  In addition to the proposed amendments, the EU also 
successfully put the issue of standard questionnaire on the rules negotiation table  
The Negotiating Group on Rules has established a Technical Group to develop a 
standardized anti-dumping questionnaire,
41  This group is making progress toward 
its goal.   
 
Issues in respect of S&D treatment for developing and least developed members, 
however, have not been specifically proposed for improvement by the EU while  
many developing participants have continuously emphasized the importance of the 
functionality of such treatment.
42  Also, S&D package for the developing countries 
should be prepared for the conclusion of the Doha Round, as mentioned in the EU’s 
objectives.  The EU, therefore, seems unlikely to put details of S&D package on the 
table before other objectives in anti-dumping negotiation have been achieved.   
 
The status of effecting the disciplines of subsidies and countervailing measures 
has been so far less animated than the anti-dumping.  In spite of this, the EU has, 
presented 2 submissions to identify issues concerned, and 2 submissions to improve 
specific rules needed.  With respect to subsidy disciplines, the EU intends to identify 
additional prohibited subsidies on the basis of the objective criteria.  This is an 
approach different from that of the U.S.  The EU thus proposed textual amendment 
on Article 3 in the SCM Agreement to cope with the disguised subsidies from the 
governments discriminatively in favor of domestic industries
43 On the disciplines of 
countervailing measures, the EU has explored issues that are asymmetric to the 
provisions of the AD Agreement.  These issues include use of the facts available, 
reviews of countervailing measures, uses of sampling techniques, newcomer reviews,, 
and constructive remedies for developing countries.    Text-based amendments to rule 
such issues have also been proposed to align with what in the AD Agreement.
44     
                                                 
39 WTO, Independent Group of Experts for Enforcement of Initiation Standards, Submission from the 
European Communities, TN/RL/GEN/109, Apr. 20, 2006. 
40 WTO, Transparency of Anti-dumping Activity, Submission from the European Communities, 
TN/RL/GEN/110, Apr. 20, 2006. 
41 WTO, Negotiating Group on Rules, Report by the Chairman to the Trade Negotiating Committee, 
TN/RL/13, July 19, 2005, at 2. 
42  See for instance, WTO, Special And Differential Treatment And Technical Assistance in Trade 
Remedies, Submission by Kenya, TN/RL/GEN/143, June 27, 2006. 
43 WTO, Subsidies, Submission from the European Communities, TN/RL/GEN/135, Apr. 24, 2006, at 
2-3. 
44 WTO, Countervailing Measures, Paper from the European Communities, TN/RL/GEN/93, Nov. 18, 
2005. 
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IV. Rethinking of EU’s TDI – Green Paper 
 
A. Global Europe - New Trade Policy for the Modern Europe 
 
1. Background 
 
Facing the global competition, the EU has growing concerns to maintain its 
prosperity and sustainable development in today’s world.  An ambitious plan, 
“Lisbon Agenda”, was thereby discussed and concluded in Lisbon European Council 
of March 2000.    “Lisbon Agenda” provides a vision that moves the EU forward to a 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010.  However, the 
objectives set up in “Lisbon Agenda” are to some extent ambitious as well as its 
coverage is too broad to be achieved with ease.
45  A revised “Lisbon Strategy” 
specifically concentrating on growth and employment was thereby endorsed by the 
EU in 2005.
46  The amendment of “Lisbon Strategy” heralded a transitional change 
for the EU’s new trade policy vis-à-vis globalization.  As trade is one of the most 
important integral components to achieve Lisbon Strategy, a contribution to the EU’s 
Growth and Jobs Strategy” was released by the Commission on October 4, 2006, 
47even though the DDA reached impasse in the year of 2006. 
 
2. Purpose 
 
The EU’s new trade policy, Global Europe, sets up clear and specific goal 
indicated in the Communication: “The purpose of this Communication is to set out the 
contribution of trade policy to stimulating growth and creating jobs in Europe. It sets 
out how, in a rapidly changing global economy, we can build a more comprehensive, 
integrated and forward-looking external trade policy that makes a stronger 
contribution to Europe's competitiveness. It stresses the need to adapt the tools of EU 
                                                 
45 See Roel Beetsma and Xavier Debrun, Implementing Lisbon: Incentives and Constraints, in Euro 
Area Policies: Selected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report No. 04/235 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, 2004); Andrew Hughes Hallett, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and Christian Richter, The 
European Economy at Cross Roads: Structural Reforms, Fiscal Constraints and the Lisbon Agenda, 
Research in International Business and Finance, 2005, at 19, 229-50. 
46 Commission Staff Working Document in support of the report from the Commission to the Spring 
European Council, March 22-23, 2005, on the Lisbon Strategy of economic, social and environmental 
renewal, SEC(2005)160, Brussels, 28.1.2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/SEC2005_160_en.pdf. Last visited on Apr. 18, 2007.       
47 Global Europe: Competing in the world. A contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy. 
Brussels, October 4, 2006. SEC (2006) 1230, [hereinafter Global Europe].  Also EU pledges more 
trade deals, calls on Europe to reject protectionism, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, 4 October 2006. ‘Europe 
to overhaul trade policy’, BBC News, October 4, 2006.   
  13trade policy to new challenges, to engage new partners, to ensure Europe remains 
open to the world and other markets open to us.”
48    Therefore, Global Europe sheds 
some light on the competitiveness of the EU industries and the need for the EU to 
adapt the tools of new trade policy to strengthen the competitiveness of EU’s 
industries on global stage. 
 
   3. Content   
 
In order to comply with the “Lisbon Strategy” which aims to stimulate growth 
and creating jobs in Europe, the Commission’s working document has setting up a 
new blueprint for a prospective EU’s external trade policy, of which purposes is to 
stimulate growth and creatin g jobs in Europe.    In the preamble of the Global Europe, 
it is emphasized that the heart of the Commission’s agenda is set up for economic 
prosperity, social justice and sustainable development and to equip Europeans for 
globalization. Though the external dimension was underlined to achieve the Growth 
and Jobs Strategy, an effective policy to boost EU’s competitiveness must link internal 
and external policies.   
 
Global Europe specifies two dimensions for a prospective EU’s trade policy.    In 
its first section, titled “seizing the opportunities of globalization”, the challenges and 
opportunities brought about by globalization are narrated.  The EU’s multilateral 
enterprises (MNEs) enjoy the fruits of globalization by combining advanced 
technologies and foreign capital with large pools of increasingly well educated labour 
in the developing world.
49 Facing the growing competition from the emerging 
economies such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the EU has 
encountered both the challenges and the opportunities on an unprecedented scale in an 
era of globalization.  In order to seize the opportunities in a world of globalization, 
the EU stands for the position that openness to trade is the key for growth and jobs in 
the EU.    While a modern trade policy for growth and jobs is considered necessary to 
strengthen EU’s competitiveness, the EU confirmed that openness to trade, internally 
and externally, is essential for growth and jobs.  In other words, the EU promotes a 
trade policy by activism abroad, but not protectionism at home.  In the era of 
globalization, the EU may thus face the dilemma that European manufacturers have to 
compete with European distributors/importers outsourced the production outside the 
EU.
50   
 
                                                 
48 Id. Global Europe, at 3. 
49 Id. Global Europe, at 4. 
50 Id. Global Europe, at 6-7. 
  14In the second part, titled “external competitiveness: an action plan for Europe”, 
the Commission initiates an action plan for Global Europe by reconfirming the 
commitments to the Doha multilateral negotiations and launching a new generation of 
FTA negotiations.
51 Special attention is paid to the last subject on Commission’s 
working schedule – to conduct a review of the effectiveness of TDI
52.  The use of 
TDI ought to be implemented against unfair trade, not to the extent that undermines 
the economic benefits of European enterprises that products are manufactured abroad 
and sold to EU’s market.  Notwithstanding, this is not to say the interests of 
outsourcing enterprises are well regarded.  The Commission also heralded the 
benefits of trade policy must pass on the citizens and society in general.  In light of 
the new challenges posed by globalization, the Commission would therefore review 
EU’s  current  TDI.   
 
B.  The  Challenges  of  TDI 
 
1.  TDI Framework   
 
The regime of TDI in the EU is comprised of trade protection measures 
concerning anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguards.    TDI is functioned as a trade 
protective mechanism against unfair priced imports, subsidized imports or abruptly 
imported goods with huge quantities in so far as these are harmful to the EU economy.   
The rules with respect to TDI in the EU are not only derived from the WTO 
agreements, i.e., the AD, SCM, and Safeguards Agreements, but also shall be operated 
in compliance with the principles thereof.  Therefore, these trade protective 
instruments may be challenged by the exporting countries in WTO adjudicating body, 
should they consider the measures in question inconsistent with WTO rules. Currently, 
the EU authorities may take protective measures with regard to dumped imports under 
Regulation 384/96.
53 As for subsidized imports and dramatic shifts in trade flows, the 
EU may initiates protective measures pursuant to the relevant provisions of 
Regulation 2026/97
54and 519/94 separately.
55  
                                                 
51 For the discussions on the EU’s new generation FTAs, see Simon J. Evenett, “Global Europe”: An 
Initial Assessment of the European Commission’s New Trade Policy, AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT, 385-395 
(2006) 
52 Supra note 47. Global Europe, at 23. 
53  See Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96 of December 22, 1995 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Union, O.J. L. 56/1, 06/03/1996; the regulation 
has been amended on several occasions, the recent amendment is Council Regulation (EC) 
No  2117/2005 of 21 December 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No  384/96 on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community, O.J. L. 340, 2005. 
54  See  Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of October 6, 1997 on protection against subsidized 
imports from countries not members of the European Community, O.J. L. 288/1, 1997.Originally, 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy proceedings were based on the same legislative instruments, given they 
  15 
Of all the trade defence instruments, anti-dumping proceedings are those most 
frequently resorted to by the EU authorities.  From 1995 to 2005, the EU imposed 
194 definitive anti-dumping measures.  China and India were the most frequently 
targeted countries and were imposed 38 and 16 measures respectively during this 
period.  With respect to anti-subsidies measures, the EU has 12 measures still in 
force at the date of October 31, 2006.  In addition, the EU has only ever imposed 8 
definitive safeguard measures under the WTO Safeguards Agreement and only one of 
these is still in force.
56  In view of the paramount practical significance of the 
anti-dumping measures in the EU, the design and application of anti-dumping tools 
always attract much attention. 
 
2.  Challenges  
       
  It is undeniable that TDI has effectively and rigorously protected EU’s interest 
against unfair trade.  There have been, however, far-reaching changes in the global 
economy and in the structure of the EU economy since the establishment of the WTO 
and last major reform of EU’s TDI.    In particular, globalization has made the practice 
of trade, not only between companies but also between countries, more complex, and 
a lot more interconnected than it was even a few years ago.  To gain competitive 
advantages internationally, many more EU companies now produce goods outside the 
EU for import into the EU, or operate their supply chains extending to non-EU states.   
This trend has challenged the conventional concepts of what constitutes EU 
production as well as EU economic interests, the things TDI intends to defend.  To 
be able to respond to these changing circumstances, the content and the use of TDI is 
needed to take account of new realities of globalization.
57  
 
  Several TDI cases in recent have highlighted an issue on whether current TDI 
system can reflect such complexity of global market.  In Footwear, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                            
had in common many substantive and procedural concepts.    This situation changed, however, with the 
enactment of Regulation 3284/94, which, for the first time, provided for a separated legal instrument to 
deal with subsidized imports. Regulation 3284/94 was replaced in 1997 by Regulation 2026/97. 
55    For safeguard measures applies to non-WTO members, see Council Regulation (EC) No 519/94 of 
March 7, 1994 on common rules for imports from certain third countries and repealing Regulations. A 
transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism for imports originating in the People’s Republic of 
China, see Council Regulation (EC) No 427/2003, O.J. L. 65, Mar. 8, 2003. Edwin Vermulst et al. 
Recent European Community Safeguards Policy: “Kill Them All and Let God Sort Them out?, J. World 
Trade 38(6) 955-984 (2004).     
56 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 4. 
57 EU, Commissioner Mandelson’s Meeting with the Committee on International Trade (INTA), May 29, 
2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm101_en.htm. Last visited 
on 04/09/2007. 
  16whether adoption of anti-dumping measures is consistent with the EU’s economic 
interest, i.e., Community interest, has led to a rift in the EU-25 member states.    This 
anti-dumping case was filed by Italian shoemakers, mostly small-scale and often 
family-run business with high labor cost, for complaining on leather footwear unfairly 
imported from China and Vietnam.  The Commission then launched a dumping 
investigation in July 2005 and highly exceptional measures in form of gradually 
increasing provisional anti-dumping duties are thereby imposed.
58  
 
  However, the EU members faced a deadlock on reaching agreement on proposal 
of definitive measures.
59 The disagreement on anti-dumping duties caused a bitterly 
divisive and likely damaging North-South split within the EU.  While Italy along 
with France, Spain and Portugal argued that their shoemakers were being unfairly 
smothered by their Asian counterparts, Germany, Britain and the Nordic members, 
particularly Sweden, backing from their retailers, strongly opposed the anti-dumping 
duties.  After tough negotiations, the EU-25 member states reached compromise by 
adopting highly unconventional measures in form of the 16.5 and 10 percent 
anti-dumping duties for a reduced period of time, two years instead of five years, 
against China and Vietnam respectively.
60  The tumult, caused by Footwear case, 
within the EU, however, brings into debate for the true meaning of “Community 
interest”?  In addition, some EU members, such as Sweden, also questioned the 
practices of current EU’s anti-dumping measures which have become more of an 
instrument to protect EU domestic industry from global competition.  They, thus, 
argued that EU’s trade policy is needed for further adjustment to a modern and 
globalized European economy.   
 
3.  Reflection 
 
The clamor caused by Footwear case became an impetus for the EU to revisit 
current TDI.  On May 4, 2006, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
presented a new thinking for EU’s trade policy vis-à-vis globalization.  He stated 
anti-dumping rules need to adapt to the complexity of global market, while strongly 
defending such rules as necessary to ensure public confidence in fair trade.  The 
                                                 
58 Commission Regulation (EC) No 553/2006 of 23 March 2006 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in the People's Republic of 
China and Vietnam, O.J. L.98/3, 2006, para. 293.   
59 Andrew Bounds, EU governments reject tariff plan for Chinese shoes, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, 
available at http:// 
search.ft.com/searchArticle?queryText=Chinese+and+Vietnamese&javascriptEnabled=true&id=06080
4008478    Last visited on 04/11/2007. 
60 Tom Rachman, EU imposes long-term tariffs on Asian shoes, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 4, 2006, 
available at http://www.iht.com./aritcles/2006/10/04/business/trade.php. Last visited on 04/11/2007. 
  17Commissioner also indicated he would launch a formal reflection on the use of 
anti-dumping measures in the second half of 2006.
61   
 
The TDI reform also sends a clear message - barriers to fair trade both abroad 
and within the EU must be removed.  Indeed, TDI shall be utilized to protect 
producers locate in the EU from unfair competition and it shall not be used to counter 
the genuine comparative advantages of exporting economies.  Therefore, review of 
current TDI system to reflect on the re-location of EU domestic industry to non-EU 
states, such as Asian countries, is truly in need.  Especially it is important to ensure 
the rules of Community interest test can actually provide the balance between the 
interests of domestic producers affected by, for instance, alleged dumping and those 
affected by anti-dumping measures.  The Commissioner would, therefore, consult 
with experts and industrial representatives to reflect on and possibly reform such trade 
defensive tools.
62   
 
On July 11, 2006, a seminar was held and the professional opinions regarding 
improvement of TDI were grouped and delivered.
63  The focus of the experts may 
not be identical, nevertheless, they all share with the same view that it is necessary to 
reflect upon the role of TDI in the global economy.    Some significant issues, such as 
the Community interests, and the problems in investigations were also explored in 
depth.  Further amelioration of TDI is thereby considered in need.  Whilst the 
debates raised by Footwear case came into interval, the EU announced its new trade 
policy, Global Europe.  The new trade policy indicates EU’s economic interests are 
global and highly complex. The importance of Doha multilateral negotiations on 
Rules is well noted in this communication and the need for the EU to adopt a 
modernized trade policy in a changing global economy is sought.  In particular, the 
design and application of TDI also need to reflect that complexity in order to align 
                                                 
61 EU, Europe’s response to globalization: where does EU trade policy go from here?’ Speech by Peter 
Mandelson. Wolfsberg, Switzerland,  May 4, 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm096_en.htm  
62 EU, Commissioner Mandelson’s Meeting with the Committee on International Trade (INTA), supra 
note 59. 
63 The viewpoints expressed by the invited experts focus on a broader framework of TDI. The eight 
external experts are Peter Bernert (EuroCommerce), R. Bethke, A. Van den Hoven, Ambassador Tariq 
Fatemi, C. Dordi, Sheila Page,    André Sapir (Professor of Economics, ECARES, Université Libre de 
Bruxelles), and J. Eggert (Foreign Trade Association).    Some of them paid particular attention to the 
use of anti-dumping measures.  See André Sapir,, Some Ideas for Reforming the Community 
Anti-Dumping Instrument, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/august/tradoc_129815.pdf;  J.  Eggert,  Observations on the 
EU Anti-Dumping Regulation - FTA Position for the Expert Meeting , available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_129812.pdf, Full text of the reflection 
papers delivered by the experts are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/legis/index_en.htm.. Last visited on 
04/02/2007.  
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further discussion on the reflection of current TDI although the Doha trade talks came 
to a standstill in July 2006.    On December 6, 2006, the Commission officially issued 
a green paper 
64for public consultation as a steppingstone for the reform of TDI.  
The purpose of the Green Paper is aimed at inviting a public reflection on how the EU 
can continue to use them to best effect in the European interest, as an integral part of 
the Commission’s previous Global Europe agenda.
65    In the Green Paper, all sections 
begin with a brief background description, following by some questions.  The 
Commission would welcome the views of all interested parties, including the 
viewpoints of public authorities in third countries.  The deadline to reply to the 
questionnaire is set by 31 March 2007.
66  After collecting the replies from all 
interested parties by the deadline, the Commission will proceed to make proposals on 
a revised TDI. Six major themes concerning EU’s TDI are proposed in the Green 
paper for public consultation, and thirty-two questions are accordingly proposed, 
which are discussed as follow. 
 
1. The Role of TDI in A Changing Global Economy 
 
The use of TDI is considered controversial, inter alia, in an economic sense.  
Some argue that the use of TDI is to some extent justified in that the international 
market is per se imperfect and no international competition authority exists to regulate 
and monitor the anti-competitive behaviors.  The role of TDI came as the center of 
discussion in a changing global economy.
67  Also, the more frequent use of 
anti-dumping measures also raised some doubts concerning the reluctance from the 
EU enterprises to initiate anti-subsidy investigations.  The conventional knowledge 
of TDI is that it may be too easily used at the disposal of the protectionists. Given the 
reflection on EU’s current TDI ‘does not question the fundamental value of TDI’
68, 
the role of TDI in modern global economy is open for discussion. Therefore, the 
reflection on the role of TDI may be considered as a discourse with regard to the 
                                                 
64 An EU’s Green Paper is generally aimed at initiating debates and for public consultation.    A Green 
Paper is not legally binding, but individuals and interested parties are encouraged to comment on the 
working document.    A Green Paper may be followed by a set of proposals, which may enter into law 
in later stage.  In 2006, 12 Green Papers, including Global Europe, are proposed. A full list of EU’s 
Green Papers is available at http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/index_en.htm     
65 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 3. 
66 As of 16 April 2007, 245 replies are received by the Commission. GLOAL EUROPE, Europe's Trade 
Defence Instruments in a changing global economy - A Green Paper for public consultation: Replies to 
the Questionnaire, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/rq061206_en.htm. Last visited on Apr 18 
2007.
67 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 5. 
68 Id. 
  19possible alternatives to the use of TDI and to what extent could TDI achieve its ends.   
 
2. The Weighting of Different EU Interests in TDI Investigations 
 
The Community interest test is an additional criterion in EU’s trade remedy rules. 
Before the EU is determined to impose an anti-dumping/anti-subsidy measure, the 
Commission has to demonstrate that the enforcement of TDI measures is consistent of 
the Community interests.
69 However, the dramatic changes in the economic structure 
both at EU’s scale and at global level driven by globalization rendered the EU’s 
evaluation for the ‘real’ Community interests more complicated.  As is well 
demonstrated in the abovementioned Footwear case, the Commission has to consider 
whether the interests of EU producers, the importing business or the consumers are 
well taken into account.  The common business practice of outsourcing production 
outside the EU made the weighting the interests of different EU’s economic operators 
more difficult.  Therefore, some more flexible practices are proposed to fine-tune 
trade defence measures.  For instance, the proposed measures may be adjusted 
downwards, following the community interest test.  Furthermore, whether the EU 
shall seek to have WTO Rules changed to allow Community interest tests used in 
investigations is open for discussion.   
 
3. The Launch and Conduct of Trade Defence Investigations 
 
A number of technical issues are identified relating to the launching and conduct 
of TDI investigations.
70  For example, early consultations prior to anti-dumping 
investigations are addressed.
71 Whether the use of anti-subsidy instrument against 
transition economies is admissible is to be discussed, which has been extensively 
discussed in the US recently.  The involvement of Small and Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) in trade defence investigations is noted, in that the costs are merely too high 
for the SMEs to take part in the anti-dumping/anti-subsidy investigations.  Other 
technical issues such as standing requirements, de-minimis rules, dumping margin 
calculation, new exporters and restructuring plans are also included for further 
elaboration. 
 
Most of the issues concerning the launch and conduct of trade defence 
                                                 
69 For instance, in anti-dumping regime, see Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, art. 21.1. 
70 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
71 A more exporter friendly mechanism of early consultation prior safeguard investigations has been 
stipulated in the procedure of EU’s special safeguard mechanism against China’s products.  See 
Council Regulation 427/2003, OJ L 65/1, 8.3.2003. arts. 6.5, 6.6. 
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their concerns in the past TDI practices.  For example, the review on ‘standing 
requirements’ for the Community industry to initiate an anti-dumping/anti-subsidy, 
the calculation for dumping margin with regard to ‘start-up costs’ and the treatment of 
new exporters.  Moreover, it remains open to the discussion that the early 
consultation prior to the launch of an anti-dumping/anti-subsidy case and the use of 
anti-subsidy instrument in transition economies, which is not stipulated in the WTO 
Agreements.  
 
4. The Form, Timing and Duration of TDIs 
 
With regard to the imposition, form, duration and expiry of trade, four issues are 
addressed, namely, timing of provisional measures, form, timing and duration of 
measures, reimbursement of duties after expiry review and higher thresholds for 
expiry review.
72  Some suggested that provisional anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties be adopted by the Commission by two and nine months after launching the 
investigations.  Shall the deadlines of imposing provisional anti-dumping or 
countervailing duties be shortened, the injury would be remedied more rapidly, but the 
administrative burden would also be imposed on EU’s authorities.  A more flexible 
deadline for the investigating authorities or a rigid shorter deadline for imposition 
anti-dumping measures is subject to further elaboration.  Some further discussions 
will be laid on the possibility for greater use of flexible measures in anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy investigations, i.e. shortening the duration of TDI measures depending 
upon the products in question or the industries  related.  In  addition, the threshold for 
sunset review is suggested to be higher to in prevention of renewing anti-dumping 
measures too easily.   
 
5. Transparency of TDI Investigations 
 
Ensuring the transparency is vital to the credibility of EU’s TDI.  On the one 
hand, the investigations of TDI is ought to assure the confidentiality of commercial 
information during the investigation.  On the other hand, a number of possible 
options could be considered to improve the transparency of trade defence 
investigations. The options on table include the establishment of a hearing officer 
during for trade defence investigation, public hearing for country-wide Market 
Economy Status (MES) decisions, greater openness for information regarding the 
anti-dumping committee, and better access to non-confidential files.     
                                                 
72 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 11-12.. 
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In comparison with the US trade remedy system, TDI seems less transparent in 
terms of access to confidential files.  The establishment of a new post of a hearing 
officer, the internet access to non-confidential information and more transparency to 
advisory anti-dumping and anti-subsidy committee are suggested to improve the 
transparency of TDI investigations.  In particular, public hearing on the 
determination to award MES is deemed necessary, in view of the importance and 
political sensitivity to award MES to an individual country, such as China. 
 
6. The Institutional Process 
 
The policy-making of EU’s trade policy is per se complicated.  The 
investigations are mostly dominated by the Commission, whereas the Council has the 
last say in determining the imposition of definitive trade defence measures.   
Additionally, the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction towards the decisions.  
Some concerns have been expressed that whether the investigation results shall be  
subject to further consideration.
  73   However, a more profound institutional 
arrangement might be needed, if coherence amongst the institutions at EC level is 
needed.  The sui generis of EU made it unique from all other transnational 
organization.  Nevertheless,  the  complexity  of the decision-making of EU’s decision 
on the imposition of trade defence measures is highly politicized.
74  It is therefore 
challenged whether they are the other ways to ameliorate as the decisions are made. 
 
Table 1 Green Paper and Issues Concerned 
 
  Title  Issues for public consultation in Green Paper
Part 1.    Role of TDI 
measures in global 
economy 
-  Use of TDI in global economy 
Part 2  Weighing different 
EU interests in 
investigations 
-  Community interests 
-  Viability test for EU industry 
Part 3  Launching and 
conduct of trade 
defence 
investigations 
-  Early consultations before AD investigation 
-  Market economy treatment in anti-subsidy 
investigations 
-  Standing requirements 
-  De-minimis threshold 
-  Dumping margin calculation (start-up costs 
                                                 
73 Green Paper, supra note 6, at 14. 
74 See Evenett, Simon J. and Vermulst, Edwin, The Politicisation of EC Anti-dumping Policy: Member 
States, their Votes and the European Commission. THE WORLD ECONOMY, 28(5), 701-717, May 2005 
  22  Title  Issues for public consultation in Green Paper
and OCT) 
-  New exporters review 
-  Restructuring plans 
-  Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
Part 4  Form, timing and 
duration of trade 
defence measures 
-  Timing of provisional measures 
-  More flexible measures in AD, Anti-subsidy 
investigations 
-  Reimbursement of ADD/CVD after sunset 
review 
-  Higher thresholds for expiry reviews 
Part 5  Transparency in 
trade defence 
investigations 
-  Hearing Officer 
-  Public hearing for Market Economy Status 
(MES) Decision 
-  A level playing field for information 
-  Better access to non-confidential files 
Part 6  Institutional 
arrangement 
-  To improve TDI decision-making   
 
 
V. Conclusion: An interim Assessment 
 
  Tariffs concessions have been the foci in the GATT rounds before Uruguay.  
The successful conclusion of Uruguay Round came up with several trade-related 
agreements.    International norms on rules, namely, the AD Agreement and the SCM 
were established and enforced by the WTO members.  However, the ambiguity of 
the agreement language as well as the problems in implementation has led to several 
trade disputes in context of the WTO adjudicating body.  Therefore, WTO members 
in the Doha Ministerial Meeting of 2001 decided to commence a new round of trade 
talks with regard to various trade-related issues, including the rules on trade.    An ad 
hoc negotiation body, the Negotiating Group on Rules, is thereby established to 
clarify and improve the agreements concerned, in accordance with the Doha Mandate. 
The EU, as the largest regional economy in the world, doubtless plays an influential 
role in the WTO multilateral trade negotiations.  The EU’s overall participation in 
the WTO negotiation positions may vary issue by issue.  However, EU’s 
participation in Rules negotiations and its latest development of trade policy at home 
always get special attention. 
    
  At the initial stage of Rules negotiations, the EU has set up some negotiation 
objectives based on its implementation of the agreement, and sought for some further 
clarifications on the interpretations of agreements.  The EU, being one of the most 
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the current disciplines in Rules regime.  Nevertheless, in Rules negotiation fora, the 
EU has been more prudent and reactive; instead of actively make amendments to 
current disciplines.  Even though some proposals have been contributed by the ally 
of numerous export-oriented economies, particularly the FAN associates, the EU has 
not yet expressively endorsed on these submissions. 
 
  While Doha Round seemed doomed and gloomy, the EU, on the other hand, 
launched its new trade policy, the ‘Global Europe’ framework in 2006, according to 
the goals set up by the conclusions of Lisbon European Council, i.e., the Lisbon 
Agenda of 2000.    As is heralded in the Lisbon Agenda, the EU has set up a strategy 
to maintain competitiveness with a knowledge-based economy, as well as to boost 
employment.  The Baldwin’s report mandated by the Finnish presidency suggests 
that a new paradigm of globalization is taking shape, and the EU has to be ready to 
the new challenge accompanying with the globalization.  The high intensity of 
globalization has changed the today’s international trade.    The new style of ‘trade in 
tasks’, termed by Baldwin such as off-shoring, and out-sourcing, will prevail in the 
global trade. Baldwin’s argument can be exemplified in the EU’s recent trade disputes 
on textiles and footwear imports manufactured in China.  In Footwear, the EU 
uncommonly determined to impose anti-dumping duties of 16.5% and 10% on certain 
leather shoes, by a marginal voting of 13 to 12.  The case has vividly demonstrates 
how divergent opinions of member states could be against the imports, which might 
be outsourced by EU producers.  In addition, the requirement of the ‘community 
interests’, while imposing the anti-dumping duties, has to be reconsidered in a 
globalized era.  Some argue that the interests of EU’s consumers are not 
appropriately addressed in the current TDI.    The real ‘community interests’ ought to 
shift from the protection for European producers to a more balanced consideration for 
European consumers, retailers and etc.  It might be envisaged that a public debate 
may pave way to a more coherent and modernized TDI. 
 
  In compliance with EU's overall focus on the “Lisbon agenda” which is designed 
to enhance the EU’s capacity to compete in a global economy, particularly in the 
context of its enlargement, new trade policy is thereby proposed.  In addition, 
considering the growing fragmentation and complexity of the process of production 
and supply chains as well as the growth of major new economic actors, particularly  
Asian countries, adjustment of current TDI seems needed.    A “Green Paper” for TDI, 
a part of EU’s new trade policy - the Global Europe framework, was, thus, drafted and 
presented for public consultation by the Commission at the end of 2006.  The 
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of the TDI, Community interest, the specific technical issues on the procedural issues 
and institutional arrangement, are raised for public debates.  The aim of “Green 
Paper” does not intend to challenge the fundamental value of TDI.    Rather, it intends 
to make EU’s TDI system fit in the trend of globalization as well as enhance the 
competitiveness of European multinational corporations.  Based on this goal, the 
current TDI system shall be transformed into a modernize mechanism to facilitate 
trade, but, at the same time, remain an effective response to unfair trade practices.     
 
  The resumption of DDA negotiations in 2007 would put members on the track 
toward the final stage of the Doha Round.    At the same time, the EU “Green Paper” 
for TDI is put for public consultation.  The EU’s trade policy on TDI might be 
accordingly reformed, given some consent is reached amongst the member states, and 
the different economic operators.    Some explanations are sought for EU’s change for 
TDI.  As the deadline for the replies for the Green Paper is by 31 March 2007, it is 
not yet known whether the future TDI will fine-tune, to minimal extent, the current 
TDI or a more radical reform, to a larger extent. Interestingly, issues identified in 
“Green Paper” to some extent are similar to issues concerned by the numerous 
export-oriented members of WTO, FAN in particular.  If the issues raised in “Green 
Paper” were reached consensus within member states of the EU, it is possible to 
narrow down the gap between the EU and other exporting-oriented members in the 
Rules  negotiations.  Therefore,  the  revision  on TDI may also be deemed necessary to 
forge more consensuses on the trade rules, so that the EU may strengthen the impetus 
for negotiation momentum.  The interim assessment on EU’s rules negotiations 
suggests that the EU delegation in Geneva could simply not go beyond its mandates 
from Brussels and played a more active role in international negotiations, as 
consensuses are void.  The Green Paper will lead to a series of legal documents, 
amending to the current TDI. On one hand, it can be considered as a response from 
the pressure of globalization; on the other hand, it stimulates public debate on the TDI 
and thereby forges an integral part of EU’s new trade policy in DDA.     
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